Iraq and Counterinsurgency, Part Three

The Way Forward
All but the most die-hard Kool-aid drinkers agree that after four years in Iraq, the situation does not look promising. The Bush Administration has made numerous missteps in the post-invasion period (many would argue that the invasion itself holds the seeds of the post-war failures) and the Iraqi population is not secure, oil and electricity production is at or below pre-war levels and in addition to an insurgency, the country is facing some level of civil war (or civil strife, if you prefer that term). What options does the U.S. have at this point?

Withdrawal
Some percentage of democrats (and others, both more liberal and also on the Libertarian side of the spectrum) see withdrawal from Iraq, in some form, as the most reasonable step to take. The most extreme would favor bugging out completely and letting the Iraqis sort matters out on their own--the argument being it was a war of choice, we've gotten rid of Hussein, the Iraqi government has not taken the steps necessary to unite the country and U.S. forces have no place being stuck between the warring factions. This option is attractive in the sense that it would mean no further loss of blood or treasure in a conflict that seems no closer to resolution now than it did in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. But it carries with it the dangers of making the unstable situation the status quo and of the Sunni-Shia conflict within Iraq spreading across the Middle East. Because of the West's reliance on oil from this region, there is the additional danger that U.S. economic interests could be seriously damaged. On its face, a straight withdrawal option appears dangerous.

Let me state the obvious--the straight withdrawal option is an extreme, minority position. There is a a host of options on the table in this vein, including the Iraq Study Group's proposal pushing more international engagement and bringing stakeholders such as Iran and Syria into the process. Another option is the one touted by Joe Biden, of creating a federal system for shared wealth and national defense and separate zones for the Kurds, Sunnis and Shia's. I am merely pointing out the most extreme case for argument's sake. And these other options are untried and speculative--we really don't have a good idea whether any of these options would lead to a stabilized Middle East and Iraq or not, but they are good options to consider.

Massive Escalation
The accepted premise under counterinsurgency planning is that 20 troops are needed for every 1000 people in the affected country. For Baghdad, that means that over 120,000 troops and police would be needed for an effective counterinsurgency effort. For a countrywide counterinsurgency effort, over 500,000 troops would be needed (3-400,000 more than we currently have in Iraq). Even with the recent surge, estimates are that, including Iraqi Army and police, the presence in Baghdad is less than 85,000. In General Petraeus's testimony before Congress, it's true that he has been supportive of the idea of launching a serious counterinsurgency effort in Iraq, but he is also well aware of these figures. And the 20/1000 ratio is considered the minimum for successful efforts and assumes that the commanders are well-versed in counterinsurgency methods and that the troops are also well-trained. Even if we assume for argument's sake that all of the U.S. forces are now completely well-versed in such methods, that is also assuming that the Iraqi Army and Police are similarly well-trained. And even after these shaky assumptions are made, we find that the force presence in Iraq is well below the minimum needs for such an operation. So, the other extreme option is a massive escalation of the U.S. presence in Iraq to meet the minimum and truly attempt to turn the insurgency around.

Such an escalation is impossible for two reasons. The U.S. public, after four years of dismal performance by the Bush Administration, does not have the patience or inclination to support such a surge. Polls are running in favor of some form of withdrawal and the support for the President's Way Forward is tepid at best. The biggest reason is that our military is not capable of producing such an escalation. Such an escalation would involve fully 1/3 of all U.S. forces on active duty, including all four branches, support personnel and so-forth and the 500,000 figure does not include the numbers needed in support positions. Considering our other obligations, such an escalation is totally untenable. Could we bring in a true coalition to address the situation? Sadly, because of the current lack of respect and outright distrust of the U.S., even among our stalwart allies, I don't think such a strategy would work either. Having gone it alone for four years, the Bush Administration is not likely to make much headway in convincing other nations to join in what they view as a failed adventure in Iraq.

We are caught on the horns of a dilemma--on the one hand, withdrawal would probably be destabilizing to the region and could cause serious global repercussions. On the other hand, the degree of escalation necessary to implement a successful counterinsurgency strategy is beyond our means. So what are we to do?

Splitting the Dilemma
The classic response to a dilemma is to "split the horns of the dilemma" or to find a middle ground between the two extremes--basically to say that you really don't have a dilemma on your hands, there is a middle way that will work. And as I mentioned earlier, there are proposals on the table that seek other answers within this middle ground. Ostensibly, President Bush's New Way Forward is such an attempt. His policy is to bump up the numbers of troops involved and to implement a true counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. This is not a viable option for several reasons.

The numbers game--quite frankly, a slight increase of 21,000 troops does not even approach the numbers of troops necessary to successfully implement the strategy. As I mentioned before, at a minimum the ratio of troops to population must be at least 20/1000 and that is assuming proper training and understanding of the strategy and tactics needed from top to bottom. In terms of the troop strength needed for such a policy to work, the President's surge is negligible. It does not provide sufficient troops to mix with the Iraqis and provide security for the population and it does not provide the troops needed to secure Iraq's borders. The latter is essential, especially with support for the insurgents and warring factions coming in from Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and other neighboring countries.

Unity of Command--this essential component of counterinsurgency doctrine is not corrected in President Bush's plan. There is still a split between military and civilian command--even if Prime Minister Malaki is truly behind the surge (a doubtful proposition at best), his goals and constituency are different from that of the U.S. military. He's gotta dance with his partners and a crackdown on Shia militias runs counter to his political needs.

The True Nature of the Beast--what we are facing in Iraq is more than just an insurgency. Certainly there are those who are fighting against the government, trying to create chaos and trying to prevent a stable national government. But in addition to the insurgents, there is a low level civil war between the Sunni and Shia, a sectarian conflict that is different from a guerrilla effort against a relatively stable central government. Recently, the U.S. has seen success in its efforts to aid the Philippine government fight an insurgency in its country but this is more of a classic insurgency: stable central government against an insurgency of outriders. But what we are trying to do in Iraq is police the sectarian conflict at the same time that we stop the insurgency and this is a far more complex situation. Additionally, this insurgency is well-armed, both from Hussein's weapons caches and from outside of Iraq and they have had four years to learn and refine their tactics. Such a complex situation calls for, if anything, more troop strength than the 20/1000 ratio called for above and it also calls for U.S. troops to step between the warring parties. This is a recipe for further disaster.

Conclusions
I've tried to simplify matters in these last three posts, to try to get at the heart of our problems in Iraq without losing the integrity of the arguments. I hope that it is clear that based on my reasoning, we have made a mess of Iraq from day one of the occupation and that our Way Forward is little more than another attempt to achieve difficult goals on the cheap. We need clear thinking on Iraq and the talking points from either side of the aisle do not provide the facts that we need to address the problems in that country. There is much that I haven't discussed, including the negative effects of Abu Ghraib and the often heavy-handed tactics we have employed. But within the limitations of these posts I hope that it has become clear that we have not done the things that we needed to do in the past and our immediate future does not look much brighter.